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CASE COMMENTS
MALES-ONLY DRAFT REGISTRATION DOES NOT VIOLATE EQUAL
PROTECTION COMPONENT OF FIFTH AMENDMENT
Rosiker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981)
In Rostker v. Goldberg' the United States Supreme Court, by giving
deference to the military powers of Congress, 2 relaxed the intermediate
standard of review3 for gender-based classifications in holding that
males-only draft registration4 does not violate the equal protection
component5 of the fifth amendment due process clause.6
The Rostker plaintiffs,7 young males subject to draft registration,
1. 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981). The issue presented in this case was extremely controversial and
drew much public attention. For the treatment by the press of this case, see, e.g., L.A. Daily J.,
Mar. 25, 1981, at 3, col. 1; id, Mar. 30, 1981, at 1, col. 2; id, July 31, 1980, at 1, col. 6;id, July 23,
1980, at 4, col. 5; id, Apr. 9, 1980, at 1, col. 7; Nat'l L.J., Apr. 6, 1981, at 15, col 1; N.J.L.J., Aug. 7,
1980, at 8, col. 1; id, Jan. 15, 1981, at 2, col. 3; id, Aug. 14, 1980, at 6, col. 1. See also Brief of
Appellees In Opposition To Motion To Intervene of Stacey Acker, et al., app. A, Rostker v.
Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981); Reply of Stacey Acker, et al., Movant For Intervention, To Brief
of Appellees In Opposition To Motion To Intervene, app. A, Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646
(198 1); Young, Divided Court Upholds Male-Only Draft, 67 A.B.A.J. 1028 (1981).
2. The Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o raise and support Armies," "[tio provide
and maintain a Navy," and "[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval forces." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14.
3. The Supreme Court applies three levels of scrutiny, or tests, to review equal protection
challenges: (I) the rational basis test (minimal scrutiny), see notes 24-28 infra and accompanying
text; (2) the substantial relation test announced in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (intermedi-
ate scrutiny), see notes 39-46 infra and accompanying text; and (3) strict scrutiny, see note 24
infra. The test that is normally applied to review gender-based classifications challenged on equal
protection grounds is the Craig standard of intermediate review. To pass this test the Court must
find that the challenged classification is substantially related to the achievement of an important
governmental interest.
4. See note 8 infra.
5. In Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 500 n.3 (1975), the Court stated: "Although it
contains no Equal Protection clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause prohibits the Federal Government from engaging in discrimination that is 'so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.' Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)." See
generally Karst, The Fi/?h Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C.L. REV. 541 (1977).
6. The fifth amendment states in pertinent part: "No person shall... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. The original plaintiffs, three males under 18 years of age subject to registration and a
fourth male who had registered with the Selective Service System, brought the action both indi-
vidually and as representatives of a class. On June 25, 1975, Robert L. Goldberg was permitted to
intervene as a party plaintif on July 22, 1975, the three plaintiffs under 18 years of age were
dismissed as parties to the action. See Goldberg v. Tarr, 510 F. Supp. 292, 292 n.1 (E.D. Pa.
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challenged the Military Selective Service Act8 on several grounds,9
1980). Before the district court heard the case, Owen F. Jones, a 19-year-old male subject to
registration with the Selective Service System, was also allowed to intervene as a party-plaintiff.
See Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. 586, 587 (E.D. Pa. 1980). On July 1, 1980, the district court
certified a class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) comprising "all male persons who are registered or
subject to registration under 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 or are liable for training and service.., under
50 U.S.C. app. §§ 454, 456(h) and 467(c)." 509 F. Supp. at 589. In addition, the district court
further refined the plaintiff class by holding that only "those members of the class born in 1960
and 1961 who were required ... to present themselves for registration," id at 586, and "those
... who registered before April 1, 1975," id at 590, had standing to sue.
8. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451-473 (1976) (repealed in part-§§ 452, 457). The specific section
challenged on sex discrimination grounds was 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (1976), which provides in
pertinent part as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this title, it shall be the duty of every male citizen of the
United States, and every other male person residing in the United States, who, on the
day or days fixed for the first or any subsequent registration, is between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-six, to present himself for and submit to registration at such time or
times and place or places, and in such manner, as shall be determined by proclamation
of the President and by rules and regulations prescribed hereunder.
Under authority of this section, President Ford terminated registration by issuing Pres. Proc.
No. 4360, 40 Fed. Reg. 14,567 (1975), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 453, at 15 (1976). In response
to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, see 16 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 198 (Jan. 23, 1980),
President Carter, on Feb. 11, 1980, recommended to Congress that funds be appropriated to rein-
stitute registration and that the Military Selective Service Act be amended to authorize the regis-
tration of women. H.R. Doc. No. 96-267,96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); HOUSE COMM. ON ARMED
SERVICES, 96TH CONG. 2D SESS., PRESIDENTIAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SELECTIVE SERVICE
REFORM (Comm. Print 1980). Subsequently both houses of Congress conducted hearings on
whether women should be included in registration plans and whether funds should be allocated.
See, e.g., Dept. of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981: Hearings on S.
2294 Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); Dept. of Defense
Authorization for Appropriationsfor Fiscal Year 1981: Hearings on Hi. 6495 Before the House
Comm on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); Hearings on National Service Legislation
Before the Subcomm. on Military Personnel of the House Comm. on Armed Serices, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1980). The Senate Armed Services Committee issued a report rejecting all proposals to
register women and stated twelve specific findings to justify this rejection. S. REP. No. 96-826,
96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2643. The House passed
H.R.J. Res. 521, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 94 Stat. 552 (1980), which appropriated funds for registra-
tion, on April 22, 1980. 126 CONG. REc. H2752 (1980). The Senate passed H.R.J. Res. 521 on
June 12, 1980. 126 CONG. REc. S6773 (1980). The amount appropriated was less than the amount
President Carter requested due to Congress' refusal to register women. See S. REP. No. 96-789,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The House-Senate Conference on H.R.J. Res. 521 adopted the find-
ings of the Senate Armed Services Committee regarding reasons not to include women in registra-
tion plans. S. CON. REP. No. 95-895, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2612. Both houses of Congress adopted these findings when they passed S. CON. REP.
No. 96-895, 126 CONG. REC. H7800, S11646 (1980). The full Congress passed H.R.J. Res. 521 on
June 27, 1980, see 126 CONG. REC. 2922 (1980), and President Carter signed it on June 28, 1980.
The Selective Service System immediately promulgated new regulations setting forth procedures
for an all-male registration. 45 Fed. Reg. 40,577 (1980). On July 2, 1980, President Carter issued
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including sex discrimination.10 The district court dismissed the entire
case for lack of justiciability,I t but the court of appeals reversed the
dismissal of the sex discrimination claims.' 2 On remand a three-judge
district court 3 denied defendants' pre-trial motions to dismiss for lack
of standing 14 and for summary judgment. 5  After hearing the case,' 6
the same court declared the males-only provisions of the Military Se-
lective Service Act unconstitutional on the basis of sex discrimination
and issued a permanent injunction three days before registration was to
Proc. No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg. 45,247 (1980), ordering the registration of males ages 18 through 26
to begin on July 21, 1980.
In addition, in 1979 Congressional committees and subcommittees had considered whether to
register women and had rejected the proposal. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 109 Be/ore the Senate
Comm. on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Reinstitution of Proceduresfor Registration
Under the Military Selective Service Act: Hearings on S. 109 and S. 226 be/ore the Subcomrz on
Manpower andPersonnel ofthe Senate Comm.L on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S.
REP. No. 96-226, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
9. The original plaintiffs, see note 7supra, filed their claim on June 16, 1971, seeking declar-
atory and injunctive relief. They alleged, in addition to the sex discrimination claim, that the
Military Selective Service Act "amounted to a taking of property without due process, imposed
involuntary servitude, violated rights of free expression and assembly, [and] was unlawfully im-
plemented to advance an unconstitutional war." Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 2650 n.2
(1981).
10. The district court summarized plaintiffs' specific contention as follows: "[Miales only are
subject to registration for the draft, and therefore there is an increased probability of the male
plaintiffs actually being inducted because the pool of draft eligibles is decreased by the exclusion
of females." Goldberg v. Tarr, 510 F. Supp. 292, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
11. Rowland v. Tarr, 341 F. Supp. 339 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd, 480 F.2d 545 (3d Cir. 1973).
The court's reasoning is not entirely clear because it discusses the political questions doctrine, the
military powers of Congress, and judicial deference, but never makes any explicit connection be-
tween these subjects and the result in the case. Nevertheless, the Rowland court's statement that
"dismissal for nonjudiciability is necessary," id at 341, indicates that the court viewed a challenge
to draft registration as nonjusticiable.
12. Rowland v. Tarr, 480 F.2d 545 (3d Cir. 1973). The court noted that "[flrom the district
court's opinion we are unable to determine on what basis it rejected this particular count." Id at
547.
13. "The Act authorizing three-judge courts to hear claims such as this was repealed in 1976,
Pub. L. 94-381, §§ 1 and 2, 90 Stat. 1119 (Aug. 12, 1976), but remains applicable to suits filed
before repeal, id, § 7, 90 Stat. 1120." Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 2650 n.2 (1981).
14. Rowland v. Tarr, 378 F. Supp. 766 (E.D. Pa. 1974). Following this refusal to dismiss, no
further action was taken on the case for five years. In 1979 the case was still on the district court
docket and, after the court proposed to dismiss the case for inaction, further discovery occurred,
thus reviving the dispute.
15. Goldberg v. Tarr, 510 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1980). The ground for denial was the
inadequacy of the record before the court to make findings of fact. See id at 296-97.
16. The court heard the case on the basis of a "Joint Documentary and Stipulated Record."
Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. 586, 588 (E.D. Pa.), stayed, 448 U.S. 1306 (1980) (Brennan,
Circuit Justice), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981).
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begin.17
Upon an appeal by the government, Justice Brennan, sitting as Cir-
cuit Justice, stayed the injunction order one day after it was issued so
that registration could begin as scheduled. 8 The United States
Supreme Court thereafter noted probable jurisdiction 19 and held: Re-
gistration of males but not females under the Military Selective Service
Act does not violate the fifth amendment because women are excluded
from combat service by statute2° or military policy 2' and therefore are
not similarly situated for purposes of registration for the draft.22
The equal protection component of the fifth amendment due process
clause protects persons from unlawful federal discrimination on the ba-
sis of gender.23 The proper test24 for determining when a gender classi-
17. Id at 605. Registration was to begin on July 21, 1980. Proc. No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg.
45,247 (1980), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 453, at 16 (1981). See note 8 supra.
18. Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306 (Brennan, Circuit Justice), stay'g 509 F. Supp. 586
(E.D. Pa. 1980). Among his reasons for issuing the stay, Justice Brennan stated that "it does seem
to me that the prospects of reversal can be characterized as 'fair.'" Id at 1309.
19. Rostker v. Goldberg, 449 U.S. 1009 (1980) (mem.).
20. 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (Supp. 11 1978) provides in pertinent part: "[W]omen may not be as-
signed to duty on vessels or in aircraft that are engaged in combat missions. ... 10 U.S.C.
§ 8549 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Female members of the Air Forces may not be assigned
to duty in aircraft engaged in combat missions."
21. 101 S. Ct. at 2657.
22. Id at 2659.
23. Not all statutes that classify on the basis of gender are unlawful. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416
U.S. 351 (1974). The Court in Kahn stated: "Gender has never been rejected as an impermissible
classification in all instances. Congress has not so far drafted women into the Armed Services, 50
U.S.C. app. § 454." Id at 356 n.10. See also Shaman, The Rule ofReasonableness in Constitu-
tionalAdjudication: Toward the End of Irresponsible Judicial Review and the Establishment ofa
Viable Theory ofthe Equal Protection Clause, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 153, 167-68 (1975).
24. With the exception of gender-based classifications, the Supreme Court has developed two
levels of scrutiny, or tests, for assessing equal protection claims. The lower tier of scrutiny is the
rational basis test, which the Court has traditionally applied to challenges to economic and social
legislation. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); Massachusetts
Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106
(1949). For a definition of the rational basis test, see text accompanying note 27 infra.
The upper tier of scrutiny is the strict scrutiny test, under which a statute will not be upheld
unless it is necessary to the achievement of a compelling governmental interest. This strict level of
scrutiny is normally reserved for challenges to statutes that classify on the basis of a suspect classi-
fication (race and nationality) or that touch upon fundamental rights (voting and elections, access
to courts, and interstate travel). See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (access to
civil courts); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (travel); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (race); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956) (access to criminal appellate courts); Korematsu v. United Sates, 323 U.S. 214
(1944) (nationality). See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
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fication is unlawful has not always been clear in recent decades."
Prior to the 1970s the Supreme Court applied the rational basis test
to gender classifications challenged on equal protection grounds.26
Under this test a statute is presumed valid and upheld if the court finds
a rational relationship between the particular classification and a legiti-
mate governmental interest.27  Applying this test meant, as a practical
matter, that most equal protection challenges to gender-based classifi-
cations failed28 because the scrutiny of the statute was minimal.
LAW 670-971 (10th ed. 1980); Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality Flawed Interpretation of
Equal Protection, 58 TEx. L. REV. 1029 (1980); Gunther, Foreword- In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I (1972); Nowak,
Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral,
and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071 (1974); Shaman, supra note 23; Tussman & ten-
Brock, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949); Wilkinson, The Supreme
Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV.
945 (1975); Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
25. See Michael M. v. California, 450 U.S. 464, 468 (1981) ("[a]s is evident from our opin-
ions, the Court had some difficulty in agreeing upon the proper approach and analysis in cases
involving challenges to gender-based classifications"); Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1309
(1980) (Brennan, Circuit Justice) ("[i]n the past, the standard of review to be applied in gender-
based discrimination cases has been a subject of considerable debate"); Cassen, Equal Protection-
Equal Status: A Summary of Sex Discrimination Cases Since Frontiero, 11 LINCOLN L. REV. 167,
168 (1980) ("[tlhis switching of standards and rationales for treatment of women as citizens under
the law has created confusion and uncertainty"). See generally Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the
Constitution, 52 TUL. L. REV. 451 (1978); Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CINN. L.
REv. 1 (1975); Goldstein, The Constitutional Status of Women: The Burger Court and the Sexual
Revolution in American Law, 3 L. & PoL'Y Q. 5 (1981); Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the
Supreme Court-1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 617 (1974); Roberts, Gender-Based Draft Registra-
tion, Congressional Policy and Equal Protection: A Proposal For Deferential Middle-Tier Review,
27 WAYNE L. REV. 35 (1980); Steele, Males Only Draft Registration: An Equal Protection Analysis,
11 CuM. L. REV. 295 (1980); 1976 Wis. L. REV. 330.
26. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (limiting jury service to women volunteers
upheld) (effectively overruled by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)); Goesaert v. Cleary,
335 U.S. 464 (1948) (prohibition against women obtaining bartender's licenses upheld); Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (maximum hours limitation for female laundry and factor workers
upheld). See also Eastwood, The Double Standard of Justice: Women's Rights Under the Constitu-
tion, 5 VAL. L. REV. 281, 283-91 (1971); Erickson, Women and the Supreme Court: Anatomy Is
Destiny, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 209, 214-21 (1974); Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution,
supra note 25, at 454-57; Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, supra note 25, at 16; Goldstein,
supra note 25, at 6-7; Note, supra note 24, at 1077-87; Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protec-
tion: Do We Need a ConstitutionalAmendment?, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1499, 1502-16 (1971); 1981
UTAH L. REV. 431, 434-35.
27. See generally Barrett, The Rational Basis Standard For Equal Protection Review of Ordi-
nary Legislative Classifications, 68 KY. L.J. 845, 851-56 (1980); Eastwood, supra note 26, at 283-91;
Shaman, supra note 23, at 159-71; Wilkinson, supra note 24, at 951; Note, supra note 24, at 1077-
87; Note, supra note 26, at 1502-16.
28. See Erickson, supra note 26, at 214-21; Ginsburg, Sex Equality andthe Constitution, supra
Number 4]
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In Reed v. Reed,29 however, a unanimous Court struck down an
Idaho statute that gave preference to males over females in the appoint-
ment of estate administrators." Even though the Reed Court em-
ployed deferential, rational basis language,3 ' it apparently applied a
higher level of scrutiny.32 A clear departure from the rational basis
standard occurred in Fronliero v. Richardson,33 in which the Court
struck down a dependents' benefits law for military service members.34
In a plurality opinion, Justice Brennan declared gender a suspect classi-
fication,35 subject to the strict scrutiny test.36  Although four justices
dissented from that classification, they did concur in the result.3 7
Hence, the correct equal protection analysis to apply in sex discrimina-
tion cases was unclear.38
note 25, at 457; Gunther, supra note 24, at 19; Shaman, supra note 23, at 174; 1976 Wis. L. REv.
330, 334.
29. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
30. The Court found the classification to be "arbitrary line drawing." Id at 76.
31. "The question presented by this case, then, is whether a difference in the sex of competing
applications for letters of administration bears a rational relationship to a state objective that is
sought to be advanced by the operation [of the statute.]" Id
32. The Court stated: "A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having afair and substantial relation to the object of the legisla-
tion, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)." Id (emphasis added). See also Erickson, supra note 26, at
221-24; Goldstein, supra note 25, at 7-10; Johnston, supra note 25, at 621-26; Note, DevelopingAn
Equal Protection Standardfor Gender Discrimination Cases-where's the Rub?, 11 RUT.-CAM. L.J.
293, 295-96 (1980); 45 TENN. L. REv. 514, 517-18 (1978); 19 WASHBURN L.J. 365, 367-68 (1980);
17 WASHBURN L.J. 182, 184 (1977).
33. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
34. The law allowed a male serviceman to claim his wife without any showing of depen-
dency, whereas a female servicewoman was required to prove that her husband was dependent
upon her for one-half of his support before she could claim him. Id at 678-79.
35. Id at 688.
36. See note 24 supra.
37. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691-92 (1973).
38. Compare Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) with Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975). In Kahn the Court upheld a Florida law granting property tax exemptions to widows,
but not to widowers. The Court found the classification acceptable due to its purpose of remedy-
ing past and present sex discrimination in the job market. The Court purported to apply the Reed
standard, quoting its "fair and substantial relation" language. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. at 355.
In Weinberger, however, the Court struck down a Social Security wage-earner death benefits pro-
gram in which a deceased husband's benefits went to his wife and children, while a deceased
wife's benefits went only to her children. The Court scrutinized the program's "actual" and "ar-
ticulated" purposes closely, and, upon finding no actual benign purpose, declared the classification
impermissible. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 648-53.
Compare also Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) with Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975). In Stanton the Court invalidated a Utah statute that set the age of majority for females at
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss4/11
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In Craig v. Boren39 the Court finally appeared to settle the issue4° of
the applicable level of scrutiny for gender-based equal protection chal-
lenges. The Court, although stating that Reed4' represented the proper
standard, actually articulated an intermediate level of scrutiny by re-
quiring gender classifications to serve and be substantially related to
the achievement of important government objectives.42 Employing this
means/end analysis, the Court struck down the Oklahoma statute that
prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to females under eighteen and males
under twenty-one. Despite the statute's articulated safety purpose and
statistical justifications, 43 the Court held that the statute impermissibly
discriminated against males aged eighteen to twenty-one.44
The Court has subsequently cited and applied Craig in a variety of
equal protection challenges to gender-based classifications as represent-
ing the proper standard for review.45 Recent decisions indicate that the
18 years and for males at 21 years. In Schlesinger the Court, distinguishing Reed and Frontiero as
having involved sex discrimination for administrative convenience, upheld a naval promotion
system that gave preference to women. Males failing to be promoted for a second time within
nine years were discharged, whereas females were not discharged until passed up for promotion
twice within 13 years. Utilizing a "similarly situated" analysis, the Court found the distinction
justified because of the combat restrictions placed upon women, but not men. Schlesinger v. Bal-
lard, 419 U.S. at 508.
See generally Baker, supra note 24, at 1084-89; Cassen, supra note 25, at 171-76; Erickson,
Equality Between the Sexes in the 1980s, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 591, 596 (1979); Erickson, Kahn,
Ballard, and Wifesenfeld" A New Equal Protection Test In 'Reverse" Sex Discrimination Cases, 42
BROOKLYN L. REv. 1, 4-38 (1975); Erickson, supra note 26, at 224-30; Getman, The Emerging
Constitutional Princile of Sexual Equality, 1972 Sup. CT. REV. 157, 159; Ginsburg, Sex Equality
and the Constitution, supra note 25, at 464-68; Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, supra note
25, at 21-23; Goldstein, supra note 25, at 10-12; Johnston, supra note 25, at 635-42, 661-73; Nowak,
supra note 24, 1075-79; Roberts, supra note 25, at 47-49; Wilkinson, supra note 24, at 982-89;
Note, supra note 32, at 296-98; 45 TENN. L. REV. 514, 518-23 (1978); 19 WASHBURN L.J. 365, 368
(1980); 17 WASHBURN L.J. 182, 184-88 (1978); 1976 Wis. L. REv. 330, 335-41.
39. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
40. Justice Powell, admitting that the issue was not settled by prior cases, stated: "As is
evident from our opinions, the Court has had difficulty in agreeing upon a standard of equal
protection analysis that can be applied consistently to the wide variety of legislative classifica-
tions." Id at 210 (Powell, J., concurring).
41. The standard actually articulated in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), resembled the
rational basis test. See note 31 supra. But see note 32 supra. See generally notes 29-32 supra and
accompanying text.
42. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
43. Id at 199-204.
44. Id at 204, 210.
45. See, eg., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977). The Webster Court applied Craig to sustain a Social Security statute that allowed females
to receive higher old-age insurance benefits than males. 430 U.S. at 318. The Court found an
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Court is committed to the Craig standard and will invoke it to review
equal protection claims grounded upon sex discrimination.46
The sex classification line of equal protection cases, however, is not
the only relevant strand of precedent involved in Rostker v. Goldberg.47
Because passage of the Military Selective Service Act was an exercise of
the military powers of Congress and the decision to refrain from in-
cluding females in registration programs was a result of extensive legis-
lative consideration,48 the challenge to the Act's constitutionality
necessarily invokes another line of Supreme Court decisions.49
The Supreme Court often expresses a deference to congressional de-
cisions,5" especially when Congress acts pursuant to its powers over
important governmental interest in remedying the economic effects of prior sex discrimination and
a direct relationship between the means and the end. Id In Goldfarb the Court applied Craig to
invalidate a Social Security statute that provided a widow with death benefits automatically, but
required a widower to prove that he received one-half of his support from his wife's earnings. The
Court found that the statute did not substantially further any important governmental objectives,
but rather was the "accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking about females." 430
U.S. at 223. The Court found that this distinction discriminated against the female wage-earner
by giving her spouse less protection than the male wage-earner's spouse. Id at 208-09. See gener-
ally Baker, supra note 24, at 1084-94; Cassen, supra note 25, at 174-76, 184-92; Erickson, Equality
Between The Sexes in the 1980s, supra note 38, at 591-95; Ginsburg, Sex Equality andthe Constitu-
tion, supra note 25, at 468-75; Goldstein, supra note 25, at 14-18; Roberts, supra note 25, at 49-5 1;
Steele, supra note 25, at 299-301; Note, supra note 32, at 298-300; 45 TENN. L. REv. 514, 523-25
(1978); 1981 UTAH L.REv. 431, 436-38; 17 WASHBURN L.J. 182, 188 (1977).
46. See, e.g., Michael M. v. California, 450 U.S. 464 (1981); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S.
455 (1981); Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Califano v. Westcott, 443
U.S. 76 (1979); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979). See generally Cassen, supra note 25, at 184-91; Gins-
burg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, supra note 25, at 468-71; Roberts, supra note 25, at 49-52;
1981 UTAH L. REV. 431, 445.
47. 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981).
48. See note 8 supra.
49. See Roberts, supra note 25, at 81-82. Dean Roberts points out the uniqueness of the
problem involved in the constitutionality of males-only draft registration and the need to look
beyond a straight-forward Craig analysis as follows:
It is not enough to apply the Craig v. Boren standard to male-only registration without
recognizing the substantially different problems it presents. . . . It is.. . vastly differ-
ent from the contexts of the other major gender-based discrimination cases. . . . Here,
we are concerned with Congress' constitutional duty to raise and support armies,
whereas in none of the major equal protection cases has an affirmative power of Con-
gress been directly implicated.
Id at 82.
50. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 473 (1980) (Court must give recognition to
acts of Congress, yet must also enforce the equal protection clause); CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973) ("we must afford great weight to the decisions of Congress").
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military and international affairs.-' One example of this deference is
the Court's treatment of first amendment rights in the military con-
text. 2 Such deference represents a respect for the separation of powers
doctrine5 3 and a recognition of the judiciary's lack of competence to
51. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976);
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953); Lichter v. United States,
334 U.S. 742 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayaski v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931). But see United States
v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263 (1967) ("the phrase 'war power' cannot be invoked as a talismanic
incantation to support any exercise of congressional power which can be brought within its am-
bit"); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) ("[e]ven the war power does
not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties"); Hamilton v. Kentucky
Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 (1919) ("[t]he war power of the United States, like
its other powers and like the police power of the States, is subject to applicable constitutional
limitations"). See generally Roberts, supra note 25, at 74-93.
52. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). In Parker the Supreme Court upheld the
conviction of an Army captain for violating Articles 133 and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 933-934 (1975). The activities constituting the violations were "public utter-
ances wherein he promoted insubordination." Levine, The Doctrine of Military Necessi y in the
Federal Courts, 89 MIL. L. REv. 3, 7 (1980). The Court rejected the captain's claim of infringe-
ment on his right of free speech, held that Articles 133 and 134 did not violate the first amend-
ment, and stated: "While the members of the military are not excluded from the protection
granted by the First Amendment, the different character of the military community and the mili-
tary mission requires a different application of those protections." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. at 758.
See also Secretary of the Navy v. Huff, 444 U.S. 453 (1980) (upheld requirement of prior com-
mand approval to circulate petitions on overseas Navy and Marine bases); Brown v. Glines, 444
U.S. 348 (1980) (upheld requirement of prior command approval to circulate petitions on Army
base); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upheld restrictions on political speeches on military
base); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (upheld denial of conscientious objector status
to those who object only to particular wars rather than all wars); United States v. MacIntosh, 283
U.S. 605 (1931) (upheld requirement of Naturalization Act that prospective citizens must promise
to bear arms, despite conscientious objector status). For further discussion of this matter, see
Levine, supra, at 6-11; Roberts, supra note 25, at 83-87. In discussing Gillette v. United States, 401
U.S. 437 (1971), Dean Roberts notes that "[the Court justified the distinction, which to many may
seem irrational, on the grounds that Congress has special powers in the area of raising military
forces and a compelling interest in maintaining an efficient and workable draft system." Roberts,
supra note 25, at 86.
The Court has expressed similar deference to military decisions in the context of other civil
liberties. See, e.g., Middendorfv. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976) (military personnel are not entitled to
the fifth amendment right to counsel in summary court-martial proceedings); Bums v. Wilson, 346
U.S. 137 (1953) (denial of habeas corpus); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953) (same).
53. See, eg., Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953) ("folrderly government requires
that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must
be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters") (emphasis added). In Gilligan v. Morgan, 413
U.S. 1 (1973), the Court, referring to the constitutional authority of Congress over military judg-
ments and the militia, explained that "[t]he ultimate responsibility for these decisions is appropri-
ately vested in branches of the government which are periodically subject to electoral
accountability. It is this power of oversight and control of military force by elected representatives
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make judgments involving the military.14
Courts defer to the constitutional powers of Congress in the context
of equal protection and draft legislation challenges. In Schlesinger v.
Ballard,55 for example, the Court upheld preferential promotion stan-
dards for women in the Navy.5 6 A key element of the Court's reason-
ing was the acknowledgement that the main purpose of the military is
to defend the nation in wars and that Congress and the President are to
determine "how best our Armed Forces shall attend to that purpose. 57
Deference was also a major theme in Fallo v. Bell,58 in which the
Court rejected an equal protection challenge to provisions of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act of 1952.19 Even though the petitioners
challenged the Act on sex discrimination grounds, the Court deferred
to Congress' powers over aliens.6°
and officials which underlies our entire constitutional system." Id at 10. See generally Roberts,
supra note 25, at 93. See also Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291, 300 (D.D.C. 1978).
54. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 751 (1974); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10
(1973); Pauling v. McNamara, 331 F.2d 796, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 933
(1964).
55. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
56. For a discussion of the details of the preferential promotion program, see note 38 supra.
57. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975). The significance of this case was pointed
out by Dean Roberts:
It is particularly relevant because the promotion problems at issue in Ballard were a
direct result of the restrictions against women in combat, and that policy also stands at
the root of Congress' decision to exclude women from registration and induction. Sec-
ond, even though the line of "new equal protection cases" seemed well established by
then (albeit without a clear rationale), the majority in Ballard did not demand very much
in the way of factual support for its finding of a sufficient governmental interest.
Roberts, supra note 25, at 88.
See also Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1978). In Owens a district court invali-
dated, on fifth amendment equal protection grounds, a ban on the assignment of female personnel
to duty on Navy rights other than hospital ships and transports. Before reaching the merits, the
district court rejected the charge that so much deference is owed to Congress in the area of mili-
tary affairs that such an issue is a nonjusticiable political question. Although rejecting that claim,
the district court did acknowledge that a large degree of deference is due Congress in judging the
legality of exercises of its military powers. Id at 299-300. Because the portions of the statute
struck down in Owens were subsequently amended, the Supreme Court never reviewed the result.
See 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (Supp. 11 1978).
58. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
59. The challenged provisions were §§ 101(b)(1)(D) and 101(b)(2) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952. 8 U.S.C. §§ l101(b)(1)(D)-(2)(1976). The provisions gave preferences,
for admission purposes, to the alien children or parents of a United States citizen or permanent
resident. Under the challenged sections, an illegitimate child whose father was a citizen or perma-
nent resident was not accorded any preference, whereas an illegitimate child whose mother was a
citizen or permanent resident was accorded a preference.
60. The Fiallo Court began its analysis by stating that "it is important to underscore the
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Although parties have challenged draft legislation throughout the
history of the United States, courts have uniformly upheld such legisla-
tion.6' In two recent challenges to draft-related legislation, a major
concern of the Court was Congress' military powers.
In United States v. O'Brien62 the Supreme Court upheld both the
constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the burning of a draft card63
and the defendant's conviction for violating that statute. The Court
found that the incidental limitation on the defendant's first amendment
freedom of speech was justified, in part,' because the statute was en-
acted pursuant to the congressional power under the Constitution to
raise and support armies and to make all laws necessary and proper to
that end.65 The Court described this power as "broad and sweeping. '66
In Gillette v. United States67 the Court sustained the denial of consci-
entious objector status to those who oppose particular wars despite the
limited scope ofjudicial inquiry into immigration legislation. This Court has repeatedly empha-
sized that over no conceivable subject is legislative power of Congress more complete than it is
over the admission of aliens. Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909);
accord, Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972)." 430 U.S. at 792. This language is
particularly significant in light of the fact that Fiallo is a post-Craig decision. See Roberts, supra
note 25, at 87-89.
61. The following cases, upholding the draft since 1900, were compiled in Rowland v. Tarr,
341 F. Supp. 339, 342-43 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd, 480 F.2d 545 (3d Cir. 1973): United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953); Lichter v. United States,
334 U.S. 742 (1948); Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
315 U.S. 289 (1941); United States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 397 U.S. 991
(1969); United States v. Butler, 389 F.2d 172 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Hogans, 369 F.2d
359 (2d Cir. 1966); Etcheverry v. United States, 320 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1963); George v. United
States, 196 F.2d 445 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 843 (1952); Richter v. United States, 181 F.2d
591 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950); United States v. Henderson, 180 F.2d 711 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950); Warren v. United States, 177 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 947 (1950); United States v. Cook, 311 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Pa. 1970); United
States v. Crocker, 308 F. Supp. 998 (D. Minn.), aj'd, 435 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v.
SL Clair, 291 F. Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
62. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
63. 50 U.S.C. § 462(b)(3) (1976).
64. The Court found that the restriction on free speech was also justified by the fact that the
statute furthered "an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression
of free expression" and "the incidental restriction on alleged first amendment freedom is not
greater than is essential to that interest." 391 U.S. at 377.
65. Id
66. Id The Court further stated that: "We think it also apparent that the Nation has a vital
interest in having a system for raising armies that functions with maximum efficiency and is capa-
ble of easily and quickly responding to continually changing circumstances." Id at 381 (emphasis
added). See also Roberts, supra note 25, at 86.
67. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
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grant of this status to those who oppose all wars. The Court held that
the distinction was not a violation of the first amendment's free exercise
clause68 and that the burden on the plaintiff was justified by substantial
governmental interests.69 In addition, with the exception of the district
court decision in Goldberg v. Rostker,70 every lower federal court has
rejected equal protection challenges to males-only draft registration.7'
The major theme in each of these decisions was deference to Congress'
exercise of its military powers.72
In Rostker v. Goldberg,73 the Supreme Court upheld males-only draft
registration by attempting to reconcile the sex discrimination line of
68. The free exercise clause of the first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of other first amendment rights in
the military context, see note 61 supra.
69. 401 U.S. at 462. See also Roberts, supra note 25, at 87. Dean Roberts suggests that the
significance of Gillette is that it indicates "an attitude by a majority of the present Court that even
the most fundamental rights must be viewed within the context of Congress' judgment about
military necessity." Id
70. 509 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa.), stay'd, 448 U.S. 1306 (1980) (Brennan, Circuit Justice), rev'd,
101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Reiser, 532 F.2d 673 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 838
(1976); United States v. Baechler, 509 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 993 (1975);
United States v. Camara, 451 F.2d 1122 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972); United
States v. Fallon, 407 F.2d 621 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 908 (1969); Kovach v. Middendorf,
424 F. Supp. 72 (D. Del. 1976); United States v. Offord, 373 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Wis. 1974);
United States v. Yingling, 368 F. Supp. 379 (W.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Dorris, 319 F. Supp.
1306 (W.D. Pa. 1970); United States v. Cook, 311 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Pa. 1970); United States v.
Clinton, 310 F. Supp. 333 (E.D. La. 1970); Suskin v. Nixon, 304 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. II1. 1969). See
also Steele, supra note 25, at 297 n.12; Note, Women And The Draft: The Constitutionality ofAll-
Male Registration, 94 HARV. L. REv. 406, 407 n.16 (1980).
The only other exception to this line of cases was the district court decision in United States v.
Reiser, 394 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Mont. 1975), rev'd, 532 F.2d 673 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 838
(1976), which applied strict scrutiny and declared the all-male draft unconstitutional. Id at 1063-
69. The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the decision by applying a rational basis test. 532 F.2d
673 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 838 (1976).
72. See, eg., United States v. Baechler, 509 F.2d 13, 14-15 (4th Cir. 1974) ("we cannot say
Congress had no rational basis for distinction based on sex"), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 993 (1975);
United States v. Offord, 373 F. Supp. 1117, 1118 (E.D. Wis. 1974) ("the governmental interest is so
extremely urgent that courts must show greatest deference to congressional judgment"); United
States v. Clinton, 310 F. Supp. 333, 335 (E.D. La. 1970) ("Congress has full discretion to structure
the national system of obligatory service as it sees fit, limited by the Fifth Amendment's guarantee
of due process and, of course, by the Constitution's specific personal protections"; "the question of
whom to call up is essentially a political one").
73. 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981). This was a 6-3 decision: Justice White, id at 2661 (White, J.,
dissenting), and Justice Marshall, id at 2662 (Marshall, J., dissenting), wrote dissenting opinions;
Justice Brennan joined in both of these.
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cases74 with the military deference line of cases.75
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist began his analysis by rec-
ognizing the deference due congressional decisions regarding national
defense and military affairs. 76 He argued that such deference was par-
ticularly appropriate in this case because Congress had considered the
Act's constitutionality77 and "explicitly" relied upon its constitutional
military powers78 in rejecting proposals to register women. 79
Justice Rehnquist then surveyed the Court's prior decisions involv-
ing civil liberties and the military8° and those involving sex discrimina-
tion and the military."' He concluded that although Congress is not
free from the restraints of the due process clause, the military context
may require a different application of the normal tests and
74. See notes 23-46 supra and accompanying text.
75. See notes 48-72 supra and accompanying text.
76. 101 S. Ct. at 2651. Justice Rehnquist noted that "[w]henever called upon to judge the
constitutionality of an Act of Congress. . .the Court accords 'great weight to the decisions of
Congress.' CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973)." Id He also acknowl-
edged the uniqueness of the issue before the Court: "This is not, however, merely a case involving
the customary deference accorded congressional decisions. The case arises in the context of Con-
gress' authority over national defense and military affairs, and perhaps in no other area has the
Court accorded Congress greater deference." Id
77. Id Justice Rehnquist cited several examples in which Congress considered the issue of
constitutionality. Id. at 2651, 2653 n.6, 2655-56. Among these examples is Senate Report No. 96-
826, in which the Senate Armed Services Committee expressed the following view:
The arguments for treating men and women equally. . . simply cannot overcome the
judgment of our military leaders and of the Congress itself that a male-only system best
serves our national security. The Supreme Court's most recent teachings in the field of
equal protection cannot be read in isolation from its opinions giving great deference to
the judgment of Congress and military commanders in dealing with the management of
military forces and the requirements of military discipline. The Court has made it un-
mistakably clear that even our most fundamental constitutional rights must in some cir-
cumstances be modified in the light of military needs, and that Congress'judgment as to
what is necessary to preserve our national security is entitled to great deference.
S. REP. No. 96-826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 159-60, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2643, 2649-50, quotedat 101 S. Ct. at 2653 n.6.
78. 101 S. Ct. at 2651. Justice Rehnquist argued that prior decisions of the Court emphasized
the "broad and sweeping" nature of these powers as well as the lack of competence on the part of
the Court to make complex judgments in this field. .d. at 2651-52.
79. For a discussion of the procedural background and deliberations of Congress that led up
to this rejection, see note 8 supra.
80. 101 S. Ct. at 2652. Justice Rehnquist discussed Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980);
Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); and Parker v.
Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) and furthermore cited Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953) and United
States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931). See generaloi note 52 Supra.
81. 101 S. Ct. at 2652. Justice Rehnquist focused his discussion on Schiesinger v. Ballard,
419 U.S. 498 (1975) and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See generally notes 33-38
& 55-57 supra and accompanying text.
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limitations. 82
Justice Rehnquist also recognized the Court's frequent use of the
Craig test in challenges to gender-based classifications, but argued that
"[any further refinement in the applicable tests" would be of little
value.83 Thus, he did not explicitly state the level of scrutiny he was
applying--only that deference due congressional choices was at its "ap-
ogee" in this case.84
The majority opinion next examined Congress' deliberations8 5 that
led to the rejection of Military Selective Service Act amendments that
would have included women in the draft registration system. 6 Justice
Rehnquist argued that these congressional deliberations distinguished
this case from other gender-based discrimination cases because they
demonstrated that Congress "did not act 'unthinkingly.' "87 He also
determined from the findings of Congress that its purpose in reinstating
registration was to "prepare for a draft of combat troops. 88 Because
women, unlike men, cannot legally participate in combat, 89 Justice
Rehnquist concluded that men and women are "not similarly situated
for a draft or draft registration." 90 Therefore, the exemption of women
82. 101 S. Ct. at 2653. Justice Rehnquist added the following: "In deciding the question
before us we must be particularly careful not to substitute our judgment of what is desirable for
that of Congress, or our own evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the Legislative
Branch." Id (emphasis added).
83. Id at 2654. He argued that "simply labelling" the particular controversy and picking the
test that corresponds to that label "may all too readily become facile abstractions used to justify a
result." Id
84. Id Justice Rehnquist cited Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975), as exempli-
fying the manner in which courts should reconcile this deference with the usual standard of ana-
lyzing gender-based classifications. He argued that Schlesinger did not apply a different test, but
merely granted the "deference due congressional choices" in the exercise of its military powers.
101 S. Ct. at 2655. See generally note 38 supra and accompanying text.
85. See generally note 8 supra.
86. 101 S. Ct. at 2655-56. To make this point, Justice Rehnquist provided extensive docu-
mentation of these deliberations and hearings. Id
The majority also held that these materials, rather than the legislative history pertaining to the
original 1948 enactment of the Military Selective Service Act, were relevant to an evaluation of
Congress' reasons for limiting draft registration to males only. .d. at 2656. The dissenters did not
take issue with this holding.
87. Id. at 2655 (quoting Brief For Appellees at 35, Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646
(1980)).
88. Id at 2657 (emphasis added). The majority found this determination supported by testi-
mony at congressional hearings, and therefore concluded that "the courts are not free to make
their own judgment on the question." Id
89. See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
90. 101 S. Ct. at 2658.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss4/11
Number 4] MALES-ONLY DRAFT REGISTRATION 1385
from registration was not only "sufficiently but closely related to Con-
gress' purpose in authorizing registration." 9'
Although the district court relied heavily on evidence from congres-
sional hearings showing that approximately 80,000 of the initial
650,000 personnel needed in any anticipated draft could be filled by
women, 92 Justice Rehnquist found the exemption of women from draft
registration justified by several congressional findings: the additional
burdens of registering or drafting women,9 3 the estimate that the need
for women in time of mobilization would be met by volunteers,94 and
the need for military flexibility.95 Therefore, Justice Rehnquist con-
cluded, the district court erred in independently evaluating this evi-
dence rather than deferentially examining Congress' evaluation of it.9 6
Justice White, dissenting,97 did not acknowledge or discuss the defer-
ence due congressional choices in military affairs. He focused instead
on the three justifications the majority found for excluding women
from the draft and registration and, upon examination of the record,
found all three to be deficient. 98
Justice Marshall, also dissenting,99 acknowledged that deference is
due Congress' exercise of its military powers,' 0 but argued that to up-
91. Id
92. See Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. 586, 599-605 (E.D. Pa.), stayed, 448 U.S. 1306
(1980) (Brennan, Circuit Justice), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981).
93. 101 S. Ct. at 2660. See S. REP. No. 96-826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 158-59, reprinted in
[1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2643, 2648-49.
94. 101 S. Ct. at 2660 (citing S. REP. No. 96-826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 160, reprinted in [1980]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2643, 2648).
95. 101 S. Ct. at 2660. "Military flexibility" refers to the need to have a certain percentage of
noncombat support positions filled by combat-qualified personnel. This allows replacements to be
called into combat quickly, and also provides positions for combat troops upon return from being
deployed in their combat capacity. See S. REP. No. 96-826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 158, reprinted in
[1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2643, 2648.
96. 101 S. Ct. at 2660.
97. Id at 2661 (White, J., dissenting).
98. Id at 2661-62 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White found the estimated number of
women volunteers in time of mobilization unpersuasive in light of evidence that the executive
branch and the military held a contrary view. Id at 2661 (White, J., dissenting). He also argued
that the administrative burdens involved in registering all women, but only drafting a small
number as needed, was not a sufficient justification for this gender-based discrimination as a mat-
ter of law. Id at 2662 (White, J., dissenting). As for the military flexibility argument, Justice
White's examination of the record led him to conclude that the drafting of 80,000 females would
not hamper military flexibility. Id at 2662 (White, J., dissenting).
99. Id at 2662 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
100. Id at 2663-64 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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hold males-only draft registration the legislation must still satisfy the
Craig test.' 0' Justice Marshall easily concluded that Congress' interest
in raising and supporting armies was sufficiently important to satisfy
one-half of the Craig analysis. 10 2 He then turned to examining the re-
lationship between the means and the end, and he ultimately concluded
that the necessary substantial relationship did not exist. 10 3
Justice Marshall reached this conclusion by closely examining the
congressional reports and hearings on the issue of whether to register
women and by attacking the majority's justifications. One of the pri-
mary errors in the majority's reasoning, according to Justice Marshall,
was its assumption of a draft in which "every draftee must be available
for assignment to combat."'" Attacking both this hypothetical draft'0 5
and the majority's conclusion that men and women are not similarly
situated for purposes of a draft, Justice Marshall pointed to the testi-
mony in congressional hearings that 80,000 females could be utilized in
the event of mobilization.0 6 As to these 80,000 positions, he argued,
men and women are similarly situated.1 7 Justice Marshall also argued
that the record contained no evidence indicating either that the pres-
ence of females in these 80,000 positions would hinder military flex-
ibility '8 or that female volunteers would necessarily fill these 80,000
101. Id at 2664 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall saw the failure of the majority to
apply the Craig test as a "fundamental flaw" in its reasoning. Id at 2666 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
102. Id at 2663 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
103. Id at 2675 (Marshall, J., dissenting). As he saw it, the majority focused on the wrong
question in this respect, i.e., "[wihether a gender-neutral classification would substantially advance
important governmental interests." Id at 2666 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104. Id at 2668 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He thought the majority erred in considering regis-
tration as inseparable from conscription of combat troops. The majority viewed registration as a
preparation for a draft. Justice Marshall, however, looked to congressional hearings for support
of his argument that the purpose of registration is to provide "'an inventory of what the available
strength is within the military qualified pool in this country."' Id at 2667 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Reinstitution of Procedures for Registration Under the Military Selective Service Act:
Hearing on S. 198 and S. 226 before the Subcomm. on Manpower and Personnel of the Senate
Armed Services Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1980) (statement of General Rogers)).
105. 101 S. Ct. at 2667 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
106. Id at 2670 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
107. Id (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108. Id at 2673 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He argued that the military flexibility argument is
based on the unnecessary assumption that an equal number of men and women would have to be
drafted. Justice Marshall reasoned that because nothing prevented Congress from drafting only a
limited number of women, military flexibility would not be weakened by registering all women
and drafting a limited number of them, as needed. Id at 2673-74 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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positions. 109
The Supreme Court's decision in Rostker lends itself to three related
levels of analysis: first, the standard of the majority; second, the propri-
ety of this standard; and third, the adequacy of the Court's analysis of
the means/end relationship. Although the majority opinion is not free
from serious defects, the Court reached the correct result.
The most serious deficiency of Justice Rehnquist's opinion is his fail-
ure to articulate adequately the standard that he applied." 0  Obviously
he did not apply the strict Craig standard."' The Court's insistence on
an important governmental interest indicates that Craig was not forgot-
ten, but the emphasis on deference due congressional choices concern-
ing military affairs affects the means/end component of the Craig
test."t 2 The Court's scrutiny of the relationship between the exclusion
of females from registration and the ends that Congress sought to
achieve is not as searching or as thorough as a strict Craig analysis
mandates." 3 In addition, the Court apparently accepted Congress'
109. Id at 2672 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Marshall stated that the argu-
ment that Congress was justified in excluding women from draft registration on the ground of
administrative burden must fail, because it is also based on the unnecessary assumption that
women must be drafted in large numbers, if at all. Id at 2674-75 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
110. The Court extensively discussed deference and the Craig standard, but failed to articulate
the effect that one has upon the other. Justice Rehnquist's statement that "[aljnounced degrees of
'deference' to legislative judgments, just as levels of 'scrutiny,' which this Court announces that it
applies to particular classifications made by a legislative body, may all too readily become facile
abstractions used to justify a result," id at 2654, is an unsatisfactory reason for his failure to
explain how deference to Congress and the Craig standard are affected by each other. He cer-
tainly is correct that the statement of a particular standard often becomes a "facile abstraction,"
but the Court's complete failure to articulate a standard actually damages "certainty in the law,"
and weakens the strength of the Court's justification of its result.
111. Justice Marshall recognized this and saw it as a major flaw of the majority's reasoning.
See note 101 supra. Justice Rehnquist also admitted, although not explicitly, that he was not
applying the Craig analysis when he stated that the error of the district court was its failure to give
deference to Congress' evaluation of the evidence. 101 S. Ct. at 2660. Because the district court
purported to, and did, apply the Craig standard, and because the majority did not take issue with
the correctness of the district court's application of the Craig standard, it follows that the error of
the district court was in its choice to adhere to the Craig standard. Hence, the majority must not
have applied the Craig standard.
112. Dean Roberts argued that deference should have this effect upon the Craig standard
when he states that "the deference Congress may be due should come into play not in deciding
whether to apply the old rational relationship or the new important governmental interest test, but
rather in determining the substantiality of the relationship between means and ends." Roberts,
supra note 25, at 83.
113. The dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall, 101 S. Ct. at 2662 (Marshall, J., dissenting),
and the district court opinion, Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa.), stayed, 448 U.S.
Washington University Open Scholarship
1388 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 59:1371
findings without extensively evaluating the factual basis of those find-
ings.'1 4 The majority's approach, therefore, is actually a relaxed Craig
analysis, and the Court views the deference owed Congress' military
powers as a justification for this decreased scrutiny.
The Court's relaxation of the established intermediate level of review
is proper '115 in Rostker because it is consistent with, and gives adequate
1306 (1980) (Brennan, Circuit Justice), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981), exemplify an orthodox Craig
analysis.
114. Under an orthodox Craig analysis the Court would have examined all the evidence
before Congress to determine the administrative burden of registering women, the estimates of
female volunteers, and whether military flexibility would be hindered by inducting a limited
number of women. Instead the Court uncritically accepted the findings of Congress contained in
S. RaP. No. 96-826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 160-61, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2643, 2650-51. In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the Court did not accept Oklahoma's
asserted justifications of the relationship between traffic safety and allowance of males 18 to 21 to
drink 3.2% beer. The Court instead extensively evaluated the statistical evidence and found the
relationship wanting. See notes 39-44 supra and accompanying text. But see Michael M. v. Cali-
fornia, 450 U.S. 464 (1981), in which the Court purported to apply the Craig standard to a statu-
tory rape law, but actually seemed to require little justification from the state for its articulated
purposes of preventing teenage pregnancies. Id at 469-76.
115. Between the time of the district court's disposition and the decision by the Supreme
Court, several scholarly commentaries appeared discussing how the Court would, and should,
dispose of the case. See Steele, supra note 25; Committee on Federal Legislation, If the Draft Is
Resumed- Issues For 4 New Selective Service Law, 36 REc. AsS'N B. N.Y.C. 98, 105-10 (1981);
Roberts, supra note 25, at 81-92; Note, supra note 7 1, at 418-24. Both the Steele article, supra note
25, and the report of the Committee on Federal Legislation of the New York City Bar Association,
supra, assumed that the Craig analysis would apply and that males-only draft registration would
not pass muster under that standard. Neither of these articles recognized either the need for defer-
ence to Congress in this field or the application of a relaxed Craig standard.
The Note, supra note 71, did recognize that deference to Congress would be an issue when the
Supreme Court reviewed the district court's decision. "The Supreme Court has ... set aside an
area of military competence in which the judiciary will not apply the level of constitutional scru-
tiny applicable to similar governmental actions in other contexts." Id at 421. "[T]he program
might survive if the traditional judicial deference afforded Congress and the President in national
defense matters mandates a lower standard of review." Id at 418. However, the author argued
that an unrelaxed Craig analysis should apply because the Court gave deference "to executive and
legislative decisions only when the requested relief would require a court to intervene so intru-
sively as to threaten the ability of the other branches to maintain an effective national defense."
Id at 423. The author argued, largely on the basis of Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975);
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); and Orloffv.
Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953) that intervention was improper only when it required the Court to
"regulate the day-to-day operations of the military." Note, supra note 71, at 423. Because invali-
dation of males-only draft registration would not require such regulation by the Court, the author
argued that deference and a relaxation of the Craig standard would not be appropriate. Id Al-
though the author's interpretation of the cases is plausible, it is overly narrow and fails to realize
the Court's underlying concerns with national security and separation of powers. See notes 53-54
supra and accompanying text. In addition, the author's conclusion that "scrutinizing the exclu-
sion of broad groups from the pool of potential draftees under ordinary standards of judicial
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weight to, precedent granting deference to Congress' exercise of its ex-
plicit military powers.1 6 The dissenting opinions in Rostker are flawed
by their nonexistent 17 or casual treatment' I 8 of those precedents' '9 rec-
ognizing the Constitution's allocation of power over the nation's de-
fense.' 20  That allocation of power represents the framers' judgment
that power over military affairs properly belongs in the hands of the
popularly elected branch of government.' 2 1
In addition, the disagreement between the majority and the dissent
over the meaning of the record and Congress' findings illustrates the
very necessity to invoke deference in Rostker. Justice White aptly
pointed out that "the record . . . means different things to different
people."' 22 If several Justices of the Supreme Court cannot agree on
review would not hamper the executive or the legislature in making military decisions," Note,
supra note 71, at 423, is unpersuasive because Congress' decision to refrain from registering
women was based upon its explicit military powers. A judicial invalidation of that decision would
certainly "hamper" Congress' ability to make military judgments. See note 77 supra.
For arguments that the district court decision was incorrect and that a deferential version of the
Craig standard should apply, see Roberts, supra note 25, at 81-92.
116. See generally notes 48-72 supra and accompanying text. Dean Roberts refers to these
decisions as a "significant and complex line of cases which stand for the proposition that conflicts
between individual rights and national security measures must be resolved with great deference to
congressional judgments." Roberts, supra note 25, at 83-84.
If the Court relaxes its application of the tests used to review infringements on first amendment
rights--rights that are explicitly protected by the Constitution-in the military context, then it is
all the more proper to relax the tests used to review infringements on the federal guarantee of
equal protection on the basis of sex-a guarantee that the Court has read into general clauses of
the Constitution-in the same context. Strict application of the announced tests in the context of
Congress' power over military affairs would merely become, in Justice Rehnquist's words, "facile
abstractions used to justify a result." 101 S. Ct. at 2654. One commentator wrote, "the court's
decision is an affirmation of the traditional congressional primacy under the war powers clause."
Young, supra note I.
117. 101 S. Ct. at 2661 (White, J., dissenting).
118. Id at 2662 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
119. This criticism applies to the district court opinion, Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. 586
(E.D. Pa.), slawd, 448 U.S. 1306 (1980) (Brennan, Circuit Justice), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981), as
well.
120. "Here, we are concerned with Congress' constitutional duty to raise and support armies,
whereas in none of the major equal protection cases has an affirmative power of Congress been
directly implicated." Roberts, supra note 25, at 82.
121. See generally Barrett, supra note 27, at 878. The commentator states:
The virtue of our legislative system is that it provides a setting in which all of the varied
interests can bring their points of view to bear and engage in a process of bargaining and
haggling within which multiple goals can be served and compromises attained which are
tolerable to the public at large.
Id See also note 53 supra and accompanying text.
122. 101 S. Ct. at 2661 (White, J., dissenting).
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the import of testimony by military experts before Congress, 123 then
judgments regarding the best way to provide for the national defense
should rest with the elected branch of government.124  The dissenters
did not portray this wisdom. The dissenters and the district court 125
embarked upon an independent evaluation 126 of all the evidence12 7
before Congress and subjectively reached their conclusions about how
the national defense should be structured in time of emergency.128
Although the Court's choice of a deferential Craig analysis is justi-
fied by precedent and separation of powers concerns, the justification of
Congress' choice to exclude women from registration plans leaves
much to be desired as a factual matter. 29 Female registration is unnec-
essary if only combat-qualified personnel will be drafted.' 30 However,
123. Most of the testimony the dissent relied upon is that of administration or Department of
Defense officials. See id at 2668-76 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Dean Roberts argues that
"[r]eliance on the opinions of administration spokesmen in preference to the judgment of Con-
gress. . . ignores political realities. The year before, all these same spokesmen had opposed regis-
tration." Roberts, supra note 25, at 83.
124. Dean Roberts makes the following argument for defense: "It is indeed the wise course to
analyze the complicated issues of the need for combat replacements and the conflicting claims for
operational flexibility with the knowledge that Congress' constitutional responsibility and its supe-
rior experience give it something of an edge." Roberts, supra note 25, at 83. See also Young,
supra note 1, at 1028: "The best that can be said for the decision is that it involves political issues
of the greatest importance, and the Court was wise in leaving their resolution to Congress."
125. Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa.), stayed, 448 U.S. 1306 (1980) (Brennan,
Circuit Justice), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981).
126. 101 S. Ct. at 2660.
127. Justice Marshall stated that "this Court may appropriately look to the [Senate] Report in
evaluating the justification for the discrimination." Id. at 2665 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The
majority would not argue with his assertion, but Justice Marshall inappropriately went far beyond
the Senate Report and evaluated the hearings and testimony upon which the Senate Report was
based. He admitted this when he said, "I prefer to examine the findings in the Senate Report and
the testimony presented to Congress." Id at 2668 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
128. Dean Robert's criticism of the district court opinion applies to both dissenting opinions:
"[l]t is difficult to read the Goldberg opinion and not conclude that the judges there. . substi-
tuted their judgment for that of Congress on these issues." Roberts, supra note 25, at 83.
129. For a discussion of the congressional justification, see notes 93-95 supra and accompany-
ing text.
130. Both dissenting opinions admitted as much. 101 S. Ct. at 2661 (White, J., dissenting); id
at 2667 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Young, supra note 1, at 1028 ("both the majority and the
dissenters. . . seem to assume that the present prohibitions against the use of women in combat
are constitutional"). For an argument that such prohibitions are not constitutional, see Goodman,
Women, War and Equality: An Examination of Sex Discrimination in the Military, 5 WOMEN's L.
REP. 243, 264-69 (1980).
If the Court in Rostker had applied an orthodox Craig analysis and found males-only draft
registration unconstitutional, a challenge to the prohibitions against the participation of females in
combat would have been a certainty. Ironically, if the male plaintiffs had succeeded in Rosiker,
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it is the evidence indicating that 80,000 men will probably be drafted
for positions which women could legally fill' 31 that troubled the dissent
and weakened the majority's "similarly situated" analysis.'3 2 The dis-
senters convincingly rebutted the majority's three congressional justifi-
cations' 33 for not registering women to fill these 80,000 positions. 134 In
these rebuttals, however, the dissenters went far beyond the findings
contained in the Senate report, ceased to function as judges, and began
to function as legislators. 35 The majority, on the other hand, accepted
the reasonableness of the three justifications with only minimal scru-
tiny of their factual foundations. This approach is consistent with the
deferential type of Craig standard the majority applied. The Court did
not need to examine the hearings and testimony before Congress to
determine whether Congress' findings were correct because the major-
ity gave Congress the benefit of the doubt.
Proper disposition of the issue in Rostker required neither a mechan-
ical or subjective application of the Craig standard nor independent
scrutiny of expert testimony before Congress. Choosing which segment
of the citizenry will be subject to compulsory military service was, and
is, a sensitive political issue with potentially serious social and interna-
tional ramifications. 36 Because Congress relied upon its explicit con-
they would actually have been in a worse position due to such combat restrictions because, if
women were registered to fill noncombat positions in the event of a draft, then men would be
drafted only for combat positions, and the probability of a male draftee being sent into combat
would be increased. It is possible that this foresight and a desire to avoid passing on the constitu-
tionality of these combat restrictions were an unarticulated factor in the majority's reasoning.
131. See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
132. See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
133. See notes 93-95 supra and accompanying text.
134. See 101 S. Ct. at 2668-75 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall cited evidence that
the figure of 80,000 women draftees would not hinder military flexibility and argued that no evi-
dence existed demonstrating that the needed volunteers would materialize during mobilization.
135. See note 92 supra.
136. Dean Roberts is in accord when he argues:
An obvious reason why more deference should be given Congress' weighing of the argu-
ments and Congress' view of the facts concerning mobilization is that we are here deal-
ing with an issue--who shall be compelled to serve and perhaps die in defense of the
country-which is not only a fundamental political question, but also a matter given
over by the Constitution to the affirmative power of Congress.
Roberts, supra note 25, at 82.
It is interesting that the Court did not consider the social ramifications of registering women for
the draft as a possible justification for Congress' decision to register only men. One author rea-
sons that "in spite of all the emotional reactions reported by the press, almost no one seems seri-
ously to have addressed the tremendous implications, both social and military, that a draft of
women would raise." Young, supra note 1, at 1028. The fact that the Court did not consider the
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stitutional powers 137 in deciding that only males should register for the
draft, proper disposition of the claim that this congressional decision
violated the fifth amendment required a degree of deference consistent
with the integrity of Congress' authority over military affairs and na-
tional defense. By properly deferring to Congress, the Supreme Court
reached the correct result in terms of constitutional law.
It is unlikely, however, that Rostker marks a retreat by the Court
from middle-tier scrutiny of gender-based classifications. Rather, the
unique constitutional problems inherent in a challenge to males-only
draft registration'38 suggest that the Court will not apply Rostker's re-
laxed Craig analysis in future nonmilitary sex discrimination cases. 139
S.E.H.
societal impact of registering and drafting women as a possible reason for Congress' decision
cannot be explained by the Court's ignorance of the issue. On the contrary, the issue was force-
fully brought to the Court's attention by brief. See Brief in Support of the Motion to Intervene of
Stacey Acker, et al., Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981); Amicus Curiae Brief of Stacey
Acker, et al., Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981). For example, in the Motion to Inter-
vene of Stacey Acker, et al., the movants argued:
Indeed, it was Congress' belief that, in the words of Senator Heflin, "the opposition of
registering women is so widespread and pervasive that if young women were required to
register, it might jeopardize the whole registration program." 126 Cong. Rec., S. 1242
(Feb. 7, 1980). Such assessments of the broad social impact of a decision to draft women
are within the unique province of Congress to make and are not for the courts to ignore,
especially where, as here, questions of our national defense and Congress' power under
Article I, § 8 are concerned.
Motion to Intervene, at 16. The argument that societal impact was a sufficient justification for
refusing to register women was summarized in the Amicus Curiae Brief of Stacey Acker, et al., as
follows:
The impact on society of reversing the long-accepted decision that women should not be
obligated to serve in the armed forces is directly related to this country's national resolve
necessary to a successful defense posture. It is not only legitimate but compelling for
Congress to be concerned that such resolve not be weakened by forcing the public to
accept a draft registration and induction system that would be unpalatable to the citi-
zenry. Testimony was provided to the Congress to justify such a conclusion, and Con-
gress found, on the basis of this testimony and its own common-sense judgments, that
discontinuing the exclusion of women from registration and induction might endanger
the entire draft system.
Id at 8.
See also S. REP. No. 96-826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 159, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CoDE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2643, 2649.
137. See note 2 supra.
138. See note 49 supra.
139. See Young, supra note 1. See also Supreme Court Review and Contitutional Law Sympo-
sium, 50 U.S.L.W. 2187, 2187-88 (1981).
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